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SUMMARY
The paper investigates the European Community manufactures 
imports from and exports to sixteen Newly Industrializing Countries 
during the late 1970s at the one-digit sector level. In addition, 
a disaggregated analysis of the Community's manufactures
imports concentrates on possible problem sectors, defined as those 
having fairly high NIC-import shares in 1975. The interpretation 
of the nature, speed and selectivity of this trade is based upon 
a dynamic view of comparative advantages and world-wide relocation 
of industrial production dependent on the stage of economic de­
velopment. The forces at work are therefore fundamental and per­
sistent. The appropriate policy response will have to be based 
upon a well-considered view about how the EC is going to adjust 
structurally. It is shown that the actual role of the common 
commercial policy of the EC increasingly threatens to hamper ad­
justment. The paper concludes with a proposal for a liberal, 
long-run trade policy vis-à-vis the Newly Industrializing Countries, 
























































































































































































The second half of the 1970's has brouaht a sudden awareness 
of what was hitherto recognized by onlv a few. A subset of the 
'South', called the Newly Industrializincr Countries (NICs), are 
successfully implementing some of the lessons in conventional de­
velopment economics and comparative advantage, thereby rapidly 
increasing their competitive exports to the market economies of 
the North.
The present paper investigates the trade flows durina the 
late 1970's between the European Community and sixteen NICs, se­
lected primarily on the criterion of rapid growth of exports of 
manufactures to the Common Market- This will be done at a fairly 
aggregate and a disaggregated level of sector specification and 
considering briefly some other determinants of export increases 
such as direct investments of Community firms in some NICs and 
protectionist Community policies. After a short digression on 
the relation between trade policy and adjustment to imports of 
manufactures from NICs, the case for a liberal and well-consid­
ered common commercial policy towards the NICs is presented.
1. The NICs: who is who?
Although there is no established definition of NICs, one 
usually adopts the OECD (1979, p. 21) definition: less developed
countries (LDCs) that show
- a fast growth in the level and share of industrial employment
- an enlargement of export market shares in manufactures
- a rapid relative reduction in the real per capita income gap 
separating them from most OECD countries.




























































































does not provide strict demarcations for empirical research. As 
Table 1 shows, NICs are defined quite differently in different 
studies (see first four columns). Given our concentration on 
the trade flows between the EC and NICs, and the related trade 
policy of the Community, it is especially the second OECD crite­
rion that seems to be of primary concern. Yet, in passinq, it 
is not unimportant to note that NICs can be found with widely 
divergent GNP per capita. Table 1 also shows that the structur­
al growth rate of total exports is an unreliable indicator, 
ranging from 8.8% to 35.2% for 1970-1978. In comparison, it 
should not be ignored that most OPEC countries achieved rates 
between 24% - 38% and that many little noticed newcomers (often
with a very small export base) registered export growth rates 
1beyond 20%.
Concentrating on the composition of NIC exports, Table 1 
brings out clearly that the share of manufactured aoods in total 
exports is either very high for a non-OECD country (South Ko­
rea, Hong Kong, Israël) or rapidly increasing. Only two coun­
tries out of the 22 in the list (Venezuela, an OPEC member; 
Egypt) fail this test and one country is a bit sluggish in this 
dynamic club (Chile, but political reasons have counted heavily 
here).
1Such countries and territories as Ecuador (27.4%), Trinidad & 
Tobago (22.6%), St. Lucia (24.2%), Bahamas (43%; the record), 
Cuba (23.2%), Tunisia (22.9%), Congo (27.0%), Guinea (26.9%), 
Rwanda (22.4%), Botswana (27.6%), Brunei (41.6%) and Macao 
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For the purpose of the present paper, concentrating on the 
Community's relations with NICs, a further delimitation seems 
appropriate. As elaborated below, a NIC will be defined as a less 
developed country, the Community's manufactures' imports from 
which grow at least as fast as the Community's manufactures' im­
ports from the world.
This criterion eliminates those countries that would
only be NICs for the US, Canada, or Japan but not for 
the EC (like Mexico), as well as countries supplvina the EC at a 
rapidlv increasing rate with products other than manufactures, 
and those with a poor record in export crrowth of manufactures in 
general (like Yugoslavia). Since 'manufactures' is still an ag­
gregate of very many products of different sophistication, a 
moderate export performance to the EC in this aggregate may 
still conceal sharp increases at the product level. The delimi­
tation procedure can therefore only be complete on the highly 
disaggregated level. Not only would such a complete procedure 
be extremely laborious, it would also be hard to distinguish in­
cidental EC import iumps from trends. In addition, NICs tend to 
spread their industrialization efforts guickly beyond the few 
initial products and even beyond the one or two starting sec­
tors; to detect patterns therefore one would still need a more 
aagregate approach.
The above requirement eliminates from the set in Table 1 
the following countries, with EC bilateral import arowth rates 
of manufactures below +-ha+- of +-he EC import growth rate of manu­
factures from the world (107.2% for 1975-1979): Yugoslavia
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It leaves the following sixteen NICs for the p r e s e n t  study: 
South Korea, Sinaapore, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, India, Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Ar­
gentina, Israel and Egypt.
About half of these countries have special trade relation­
ships with the EC. Greece has become a member of the Community 
as of Jan. 1, 1981, although its market access will only gradually 
improve. In a few years, however, its status may be
expected to be comparable to another dynamic exporter within the 
Common Market: Ireland. It is quite obvious that by the middle of the
1980's trade policy measures against Greece will become practi­
cally impossible. Spain and Portugal have applied for member­
ship. At present Spain has marginally and Portugal considerably
better access than non-Lome LDCs (as an EFTA member it has free 
access for most industrial products since 1977, and faced lower 
tariffs before). Relations with Turkey are theoretically similar
to those with Israël but various political sensitivities have 
caused serious problems in the past (and again in Sept. 1980).
Israël enjovs free-trade-area status for industrial goods since 
1977. Philippines, Singapore. Thailand and Malaysia are members 
of ASEAN, which has concluded a trade treaty with the EC in 1979.
Its influence on the analysis of the recent past is negligible,
Venezuela falls out as well as it is an OPEC member. In the 
near future ignoring it might be incorrect. From 1975-1979 EC 
manufactures' imports from Venezuela soared from 4 million (EUR) 
to 77 million ECU. This absolute value is however still insia- 





























































































but future trade policy will have to reckon with this fact.
None of the sixteen NICs considered here are parties to the 
Lome Convention, but South Korea, Hong Kong, India, Brazil,
Argentina and Eqypt benefited from the Community's General­
ized Svstem of Preferences, as valid until 1980. Of course, most 
of the other countries mentioned have this possibility as well. 
Taiwan, finally, has no official diplomatic status with the Euro­
pean Communitv anv more. Althouah there are informal contacts it 
is hardly a speculation to suggest that this leaves Taiwan in an 
extremely unfavourable position, onlv mitigated by a relatively 
large stock of EC direct investments on its territory.
2. The NICs as a trade policy issue
If we icmore problems of autocratic domestic politics and of 
suppressed trade unionism, deplorable phenomena in several NICs 
(but of course common to a series of other less-develooed coun­
tries) , the NICs are a success story. Thev represent a dream of 
conventional development economics come true. Therefore, it is 
not immediately clear what the Community's policy problem could 
be the NICs would pose. Fast risina GNP per
capita and a rapidly increasing workincr population in manufacturing 
are typically achievements to be satisfied with. Onlv the idea 
that NICs increase their export market shares in manufactures 
could be worrisome, but it need not be as rapid industrialization 
creates export markets for the European Community's machinery and 
technology exporters and induces a general rise of import demand
over a large range of products. The mere fact, first brought out
3by the OECD (1979, p. 8) that import penetration of ten NICs in-
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to the OECD market of manufactured goods in 1977 had barely 
passed 1% seems to destroy anv case for considerine the NICs as 
a threat.
The Question is indeed a more subtle one.
The policy problem for the European Communitv consists in 
the nature and speed of adjustment to rising NIC shares in a 
limited number of product markets, both within the Common Market 
and outside. These problems of adjustment come on top of the 
strains caused by a less favourable errowth climate and by uncer­
tainties about energy prices, inflation and the return to busi­
ness investment. A maior issue of this paper is the role of the 
Community's common commercial policy in the adjustment to rapidly 
rising imports from NICs. It will lead us to the question 
whether an economically and diplomatically superior policy 
would not be possible.
Whether LDCs are switching from import-substitutincr to ex­
port-oriented industrialization stratecries, or development plans 
are concentrating resources on key products, rather than spread­
ing them out over a host of suboptimallv sized plants in many
percentage of apparent domestic consumption. Apparent consump­
tion is (domestic) production plus imports, minus exports. Im­
port penetration has to be distinguished from import share: 
imports, of a certain product or from a certain country, as a 
percentage of total imports. The two yardsticks may give verv 




























































































sectors, initial NIC export strategies tend to be highly specific. 
Producing large volumes of a very limited range of goods, in which 
thev know they can achieve great cost advantages, thev select one 
bier or a few medium-sized OECD economies as export markets. Such 
preciselv targeted export drives in standardized goods mav derive 
from a lack of broad marketing knowledge but they sometimes seem 
to be carefully planned within mulhin^timnal production corpora­
tions investing in NICs for the sole purpose of assembly or by 
world-wide trading companies, distribution chains and internation­
al department stores.
In addition,more advanced NICs moving into products with a 
larger physical capital content mav be aided bv the local govern­
ment or, again, bv multinational producers to set up large-scale 
industrial complexes in steel, automobiles or textiles. (~>nce pro­
duction is on stream, exports may rise extremely rapidly.
The adjustment problem being product specific and, at that 
level, one related to sudden jumps in import growth rates, the 
question is almost by definition of negligible importance on anv 
aggregate level of economic analysis or political economy. This 
creates a grave danger for undetected piecemeal protectionism, 
thought out between specialized bureaucrats and threatened produc­
er lobbies. In the European Communitv the danger is even greater 
as external commercial poliev is almost completely in the hands of 
Eurocrats, talking directly with pressure groups, and invisibly 
supported, or blackmailed, by national bureaucrats in the Commit­
tee 113, without a serious parliamentary control, and without pub­
licly accessible procedures or hearings. 'Solving' adjustment by 
piecemeal trade policy making on a high level of disaggregation 



























































































-  9 -
a while. A continuous monitoring of it is tiring and boring and 
hardly makes small headlines even in the best informed newspa­
pers .
Detecting the NICs, in so far as they pose a trade policy 
problem is therefore not quite the same as defining a NIC with 
respect to the aforementioned criteria. On the six-digit product 
specification level, a ' less developed countrv mav be seen
to have rapidly increasing exports to the EC, or to one or two 
member countries onlv, whereas that country's export performance 
on, say, the two-digit sector level need not show u d  as above-av- 
eraae. It might also fail to classifv as a NIC on the basis of 
risina GNP per capita or on the basis of an increasing share of 
employment in manufacturing. It follows that, whilst the defini­
tion of a NIC takes place at the agoreaate level very similar 
problems may also be caused— on the disaggregated level— by gen­
erally unsuccessful, poor countries with a single product line 
that manages to penetrate the EC. The point is that the NIC 
problem for the EC (and the OECD in general) is inevitably part 
of the overall adjustment to shifting comparative advantages in 
standardized products to all less developed economies.
More precisely, it has to be placed in the framework of dy­
namic comparative advantage to acquire an insight in the funda­
mental and persistent forces at work. Though the economics of 
these processes are exceedinglv complex, its broad nature is 
well-understood and has been given empirical content (Balassa,
1 979) .
The idea is that economic development in a fai rlv open world 
economy tends to follow a stages approach with respect to factor 




























































































market. On the factor input side, availability of a minimal physi­
cal, social and educational infrastructure is required. This has 
proved to be easier in development nlans than in actual practice, 
especially with respect to the latter two. Without these infra­
structural nrovisions it is difficult to exoect that product and 
factor markets can work in a poor countrv. Moreover, it seems even 
more difficult to achieve stability of suDplv and exoect sufficient 
productivity— even with the lowe.st wages —  to result in cost advan­
tages over established world producers. Tvpically, today's NICs 
tend to have either a hicrh literacv rate or an ample supply of lit­
erate, but low-skilled workers (the latter applies to India and 
Ecjypt, for instance) .
The types of products at the lower stages of development and 
comparative advantage can be associated with small scale manufac­
tures' production, like clothina of simDle varieties, simple non­
fashion footwear and handbags, simple toys and souvenirs and cer­
tain simple processed primary commodities, statistically counted as 
manufactures, such as certain wood manufactured products. The em­
phasis on 'simple' and 'small scale' has to do with the presumed 
shortage of physical capital, needed for large-scale production and 
the presumed shortage of entrepreneurial, organizational, design 
and markehinc capacity in countries that begin to industrialize.
They may advance by gradually building up experience, purchas­
ing technology, or machine-embodied technology so as to diversify 
into more demanding products. The entry into higher stages may be 
accelerated by foreign direct investment bringing in excessively 
scarce factors. These investors may re-organize or create Droduc- 
tion but they may also facilitate direct entrv into markets of ad­




























































































The other, not mutually exclusive, route is stringent planning of
industrialization by concentrating resources on a few key products
that are sufficiently standardized to expect export success, vet
sufficiently advanced to move beyond the beginnings of efficient
4manufacturing. The 'rifle-shot' approach makes sense in avoiding 
sub-optimal plant size but obviouslv risks a collision course in 
willinaly pursuing the disruption of advanced country markets if 
it is done too aagressively. However, 'rifle-shot' incidents seem 
to be typical of young NICs with insufficient diversification.
Further stages would oush the now semi-develooed countrv into 
less standardized products, or physical capital intensive goods 
with simple production processes while perhaps still improving on 
its productivity in the low-skill intensive, standardized croods in 
order to continue competina with emeraina young NICs. Eventually 
+~he nic 'graduates' into something like a newlv advanced countrv 
(a MAC-3) with a bmad industrial base, possibly seeing its initial 
success sectors decline into comparative disadvantage sectors and 
still aiming for the production of certain specialized high tech­
nologies .
Of course, one should not exaggerate the model-like smooth­
ness of this complex process. One should also beware of the fic­
tion that industrializing LDCs are all stronaly export-oriented. 
Many of them are not. Some are basing their development strategy 
on exports in a few key sectors only. It is a minoritv that is
4The expression is in Turner et al. (1980, p. 20). The celebrated 
example is about three South Korean plants producing TV sets for 
the US market (onlv!) and achieving an output of some 400,000 
units a year each. US protection forced them down to half.




























































































truly export-oriented. The trade policv issue is of course not 
that poor countries are industrializing but that a small but 
growing number of them pursue the objectives of productive effi­
ciency, growth, urban employment and maximizing foreign exchange 
earnings by relvina on exports of manufactures.
The economic case for singling out NICs as a subset is then 
that the combination of product specificity and extreme imnort 
growth rates can cause severe problems for a limited group of 
firms and traders that might push u p  the cost of immediate ad­
justment beyond the society's aains from trade.
The institutional case for singlina them out is that GATT, 
art. 19. dealing with 'market disruption'. is often avoided and 
obscure, bilateral, sometimes even unpublished trade policy in­
struments are applied as substitutes. it is the NICs that suf­
fer most from these 'lawless' commercial policv dealings, only 
too often ruled by nower and too rarely bv considerations of in­
dustrial adjustment. As demonstrated bv the Community's fever­
ish attempts to obtain agreement on a 'selective safeauard 
clause' in the Tokyo Round, the NIC issue has now assumed great 
institutional sianificance.
3. Recent EC-NIC trade in manufactures
Within the Eurotjean Community and bevond, protection 
against present NICs. and old ones like Japan has often been de­
fended in trade policy circles by pointing to extreme import 




























































































cits. The first phenomenon is suggested to indicate market dis­
ruption and the second one an inappropriate 'burden' of adjust­
ment. As both indicators will be used in this section- some fur­
ther discussion seems desirable before examination of the evi­
dence .
In the first place, import growth rates mav be considered as 
a sianal that possibilities of 'market disruption' might arise, 
especially in times of recession. However, a proper investiga­
tion would have to be conducted at a high level of di sangrega- 
tion. Moreover, the case should be made that 'serious iniurv' is 
attributable to the imports and not to technological change, fac­
tor substitution (i.e. replacing men by machines) or a fall in 
demand. Usuallv, thouah, it is one or more of the latter factors 
which cause a fall in the 'iniured' subsector's employment. If 
so, and production capacity does not fall with employment, firms 
mav be confronted with decreasing market shares due to (NIC-) 
competition. Such developments create strong pressures for pro­
tection because labour union and management can iointlv lobby, 
the former primarilv to protect jobs in that sector and the lat­
ter primarily to protect market shares and profits. Of course, 
lobbyists must present their particular case as one in which ad­
justment is impossible in such a short time span and undesirable 
given the sectoral unemployment. Import growth rates conspicu­
ously higher than domestic production help to make the case for 
protection politically digestible, especiallv if it is directed 
at the 'culprits' onlv.
In the second place, bilateral, sectoral trade balances over 
time mav be considered as a signal of declining competitiveness 




























































































declining sectoral competitiveness vis-a-vis certain countries, 
here NICs, as long as competitiveness imoroves in other product- 
croups. Economic growth in open economies such as the EC is pre­
cisely a result of continuous shifts to sectors of higher produc­
tivity either by further specialization within a sector or bv in­
tersectoral reallocation of productive resources. Furthermore, 
concern with bilateral trade flows in a multilateral trading (and 
payments) system is alien to its nature. Disaggregating them 
further into product categories, even if only of the one-digit 
variety, makes worries about balanced flows even less warranted. 
This holds especially in a North-South context where there seems 
to be ample scope for inter-industry specialization (rather than 
intra-) necessarily creating disaggregated 'imbalances' in trade 
flows. Such 'imbalances' are precisely the result of the deepen­
ing world division of labour. Finallv, one miaht fear overall 
trade imbalances for the EC because of a loss of competitiveness. 
The implicit assumption is then that exchange rates do not 
change. If exchange rates could adjust, however, there will al­
ways be comparative advantages that can be exploited. The con­
clusion is that sectoral, bilateral trade imbalances over time 
can be utilized as indicators for competitiveness. If such im­
balances enter as arauments into commercial diplomacy, and if ac­
cess to both markets is roughly comparable, there is no economic 
justification. One suspects that the political motivation could 
derive from the desire to 'do something' about NIC corrroetition or 
from a neo-mercantilist preference to maintain certain indus­
tries, without immediately slappincr tariffs or 'voluntary' export 




























































































typical prelude to further protection in the case of an ex-
5perienced ex-NIC, Japan.
c:One might have doubts whether EC access to the Japanese market 
is indeed comparable to Japanese access to the EC. Surely, there 
is evidence that hidden barriers - be they hidden in the distri­
bution system, or, in the allocation of television time, or 
otherwise - tend to suppress the inflow of EC products into 
Japan. But there is also evidence that EC firms deliberately 
avoid the problems of unacquaintedness with the Japanese market 
by opting for third markets. Furthermore, EC members have a 
poor record of providing Japan with market access. Some 
Community members already maintain several quotas against 
Japan for nearly three decades.
Most NICs are so protectionistic that market access is plainly 
not comparable with the access of NICs to the EC. The more 
developed they are the less appropriate this is. In brief, if 
a NIC 'graduates' in terms of value and composition of trade, it 
should also graduate with respect to the basic principles of 
GATT, rather than remaining exempted on the basis of a status 




























































































Pleas for protection tend to rely on other 
economic objectives (sectoral employment, preferably at the going 
wage rate) or political objectives (votes; minimum sector size 
for 'security') than real income growth. A further essential 
point is that protection imposes costs on the domestic consumer 
and the foreign (NIC) firms, especially on workers, that only 
rarely enter the calculation of decision-makers. Would policy­
makers in advanced countries explicitly underwrite their implicit 
argument that a worker in a poor NIC, thrown into unemployment 
because of protection in export markets, can 'adjust' with less 
injury than a worker in a welfare state, thrown into unemployment 
because of NIC. competition?
Table 2 provides data about the recent developments in the 
Community's trade in manufactures with the sixteen NICs selected. 
The information is presented in such a way that some major trade 
policy indicators (economically justifiable or notl can be de­
duced from it. Essential to the NIC phenomenon are import growth 
rates- of course. However, such growth rates have to be used 
with at least some information on the import value in the base- 
year (1975). Whenever the import base in 1975 is low or very 
low, thereby enabling magnified growth rates that need not be 
alarming at all, this has been indicated. Policy-makers also 
frequently use the bilateral trade balance ae an indicator.
Tnough its use as an indicator is often suspect, it has neverthe­
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-  18 -
rates are given.
The picture that arises is clear. The Community is increas­
ing its imports of manufactures from the NICs at a speed two- 
thirds higher than the rate of growth of manufactures imports 
from the world as a whole. At the same time its export perform­
ance in the same goods to NICs is markedly inferior to the over­
all growth of manufactures exported to the world. However, the 
1979 surplus with the NICs in these aoods is quite comfortable bv 
anv standard: close to 9 billion ECU, which is 48% of the Com­
munity's entire imports of manufactures from the NICs! But the 
sharply diverging arowth rates of exports and imports, if contin­
uing. are bound to undermine this eomfort rapidly. ^he «ec^nd 
half of the 1970's surely points to a worrying trend: not only
did the absolute EC surplus in manufactures' trade witn the NICs
6decline from 9174 million EuR to 8885 million ECU, but the 1975 
surplus was 32% larger than all EC. imports of manufactures from 
NICs whilst the 1979 surplus amounted to a mere 48% of those EC 
imports.
Disaggregation into three one-digit categories shows that 
the true NIC problem should not be looked for in chemicals (SITC 
5; SITC refers to Standard International Trade Classification). 
Not only are EC chemicals imports from all NICs arowina a bit 
more slowly than EC chemicals imports from the world, the country 
pattern is extremely uneven ana the 1975 base is very often low 
or extremely low. Moreover, the share of chemicals in total 
EC NIC-manufactures imports declined from an already small 5.3% 
in 1975 to 4.4% in 1979. Chemicals will therefore be ignored be-
g
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low as a comparative disadvantage good for NICs.
For machinery and transport equipment the rate of import 
growth is very high (236%), enlarging its share in EC NIC-manufac- 
tures imports from 18% in 1975 to 23% in 1979. For a number of 
NICs, their base value of exports to the EC is low or extremely 
low, so that the sometimes fantastic EC bilateral import growth 
rates will still mean very little in terms of adjustment. This is 
reflected in the EC surplus in these goods: the huge difference
in import and export growth rates has brought the surplus down 
from six times the absolute imports from NICs in 1975 to a little 
over twice the absolute imports from NICs in 1979, still very 
large though. The absolute surplus even increased from 7324 mil­
lion EUR to 9659 million ECU. Furthermore, in 1979 no less than 
46% of EC NIC-imports of machinery and transport equipment origi­
nated from Spain alone. The fact that these large imports have 
been growing some 257% over 1975-1979 seems to have been much more 
important than sensational growth rates of initially negligible 
imports from many other NICs.
It is often thought that machinery and transport equipment 
represents a category of goods strongly competitive vis-à-vis 
LDCs, even NICs. It appears, however, that the European Communi­
ty's surplus in machinery and transport equipment vis-à-vis the
Note that Southeast Asian NICs have recently increased their 
chemicals imports from the EC at conspicuously high rates. This 
might have to do with the synthetic fibre industry in these NICs. 
It should also be of interest to know that the 1979 EC surplus in 
chemicals trade with NICs is more than five times (!) the abso­
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NICs during the second half of the 1970's conceals a decline of 
comparative advantage. Even if 'comparative advantage' is a mean­
ingful concept at such a high level of aggregation--! would submit 
that it is not— one has to qualify such a sweeping conclusion by 
looking more closely at Table 2. Of the 16 NICs only three show 
both a non-small export base in these goods and a high export
growth: Spain, Hong Kong and Singapore. These three countries
8have a GNP per capita of more than #3000 (1978) and may not be 
fully comparable with most other NICs with respect to the require­
ments for exports in these semi-advanced products, but rather with 
Ireland, or perhaps even Italy. They seem to confirm the notion 
that NICs pose different competitive challenges at different lay­
ers of development, both because of product-wise and sectoral di­
versification on the output side and because of improved endowment 
of human, physical and technological capital on the input side. 
Unfortunately, the data in Table 2 are too aggregated to enable a 
proper judgment on this matter, since SITC 7 lumps together goods 
with very different input requirements and imports of widely di­
verging degrees of standardization.
Most of the concerns on the NIC exports to the EC stem, how­
ever, from imports of 'other manufactured goods' (such as tex­
tiles, steel semi-manufactures, furniture, clothing, footwear, 
etc.). Even at this aggregate level there are a series of indica­
tions for the competitiveness of the NICs. All 16 NICs individu­
ally show higher exports growth rates (to the EC) than the world 
does; the four NICs that had a 1975 export base of below 100 mil-
g
Portugal has a low export growth (to EC) of these goods, but a




























































































lion EUR have very high growth rates indeed (354% - 663%); the 
five biggest EC suppliers of these goods among the NICs increased 
their exports to the Community by 139% despite the dampening ef­
fect of (increasing) protection, often especially applying to 
their shipments; the small deficit of the Community with the NICs 
in these goods in 1975 had increased tenfold by 1979 and had ris­
en to 39% of EC imports from the NICs. But even here disaggrega­
tion seems warranted before jumping to conclusions. If the EC is 
believed to be uncompetitive in these goods, how can one under­
stand the fairly strong Community export performance to several 
East Asian NICs and to India in these goods?
A different ' picture of the Community's NIC manufactures
imports is presented in Table 3, where the growth in NIC shares
in EC imports of manufactures has been provided for the Nine as a
9whole and for 7 of its 8 economies.
In machinery and transport equipment all NIC shares in EC
imports increase but none of them had even reached the 7% level
in 1979. In other manufactured goods a similar growth picture 
1 0arises although the NIC shares are much higher.
This begs the question how arbitrary it is to use a thresh­
old NIC share of EC imports beyond which NIC competition can be 
considered to become 'important' or 'sensitive'. First of all,
Ireland is left out. As discussed before, chemicals will not be 
considered since there seems to be hardly any adjustment prob­
lem. For a comparison with Table 3, note that the NIC share in 





























































































NIC shares may rise due to competition among non-EC suppliers 
without necessarily increasing market shares. In the period con­
sidered this is not the case.
Table _3
1NIC shares in manufactures imports of the European Community
(1975-1979; percentages)
SITC 7 SITC 6/8
1975 1979 1975 1979
2EC of 9 2.70 4.36 8.60 10.71
Germany 4.0 4.9 11.1 13.1
France 3.9 6.4 7.3 9.7
Italy 1.7 6.3 7.0 11.2
Netherlands 1 .9 2.9 5.0 7.6
Belgium/Lux. 0.9 1 .0 4.6 6.7
Great Britain 2.7 4.3 12.7 13.1
Denmark 1 .0 1.6 5.9 2.3
1Notes : Only SITC 7 (machinery and transport equip-
ment) and SITC 6/8 ('other manufactured 
goods'); not chemicals (SITC 5).
2EC includes Ireland; Ireland is not listed 
separately.
Source: Calculated from source, Table 2.
Not only the NIC share of extra-EC imports has risen over the pe­
riod both for machinery and transport equipment (from 8.1% to 




























































































the ratios of extra- over intra-EC imports have moved up as well 
(resp. from 0.50 to 0.53, and from 0.69 to 0.74). In the second 
place, a rising import share accompanied with rising home produc­
tion for exports, say in quality goods, need not inflict any 
pressure on domestic producers, facilitates the shift to higher 
value-added output and is beneficial for consumers. Therefore, 
what one really wants to know are 'market shares' (or the rate of 
import penetration) rather than 'import shares'. The import pen­
etration rate, defined as imports (from NICs) as a percentage of 
apparent domestic consumption (domestic production minus exports
plus all imports), is very hard to come by for statistical rea- 
11sons. This is unfortunate since a rising penetration rate nec­
essarily means more competition and a lower market share in the 
domestic market. The loss of strength in the domestic market is 
a fate every producer would like to avoid, no matter how strong 
his exports are. Furthermore, competitive pressures of NICs are 
easily relayed to third markets which would spell contraction 
abroad. However, the condition for using penetration rates and 
even more for import shares, to indicate the 'sensitivity' to NIC 
imports is that the level of disaggregation is high so as to be 
reasonably sure about the homogeneity of the products. But even 
at the three-digit product specification of many products this 
homogeneity condition is not easily fulfilled. A striking illus­
tration of the point is in SITC 831 (travel goods, handbags, 
etc.) where Italy joins other EC members in having high NIC
11The most important reason is that trade and industry statistics 
are insufficiently harmonized as to their nomenclatures. Pene­
tration rates, if published at all, are usually several years 




























































































shares of these imports while persisting its export drive unabat- 
edly, in contrast to all other EC members where exports have van­
ished. The explanation is that further disaggregation would show 
Italy's great comparative advantage in the luxurious 'up-market' 
products within this category. Using import shares is therefore 
second best to penetration rates, if available at all. The meth­
od is not fully reliable as an indicator of 'sensitivity' to NIC 
competition.
It follows that Table 3 should be used with caution. Per­
haps the most interesting aspect is the change in import shares. 
In machinery and transport equipment Spanish auto exports to 
France and Italy seems to be a major cause for a rapid increase of 
the NIC share, while in other manufactured goods the same phenom­
enon is more muted. Another interesting feature is the moderate 
increase in the NIC share of British imports of 'other manufac­
tured goods'. One wonders whether Britain has been allowed to be 
more protectionist, either informally or within the common com­
mercial policy.
4. A disaggregated analysis of selected sectors
The previous section provides a useful perspective but the 
core of the NIC problem can only be studied by disaggregating 
further (Hager, 1980). On the other hand, it seems impossible to 
extract a coherent picture from the multitudinous nitty-gritty 
issues of daily trade policy on the product level.
A reasonable compromise will be adopted in taking a consid­
erably higher level of disaggregation than in the previous sec­
tion without risking to lose oversight by studying many thousands 




























































































of SITC specification. The example of textiles (not clothing) may 
illustrate what is involved. Textiles are first specified as a 
sector at the two-digit level (as 65): the NIC share in total EC
imports of textiles was 9.3% in 1975. At the disaggregated level 
one may observe a NIC share of 1.5% in EC imports of 'yarn of con­
tinuous synthetic fibres, etc.' (SITC 65161), next to a NIC share 
of 58% in 'cotton yarn & thread, grey, not mercerized' (SITC 6513) 
and one of 27.9% when the same cotton yarn & thread is mercerized, 
bleached or dyed (SITC 6514). Yet, the EC total of the latter two 
imports together, though on the four-digit level, is only half the
value of the EC total of the imports of the former, despite its
1 2classification at the five-digit level. Except for specific 
sectoral studies, it seems more useful to move beyond the casuist­
ry of literally thousands of product types with very different im­
port weight and attempt to grasp the nature and extent of the 
problem of varying levels of intermediate aggregation. Even with 
such an approach the degree of detail already hampers the con­
sistent reference to the underlying process of world-wide struc-
1 3tural economic change. It also has to be realized that the 
choice of 'machinery and transport equipment' plus 'other manufac­
tured goods' makes the analysis even more selective.
One drawback of this method ought to be kept in mind as it 
occasionally may play a role: at the intermediate levels of dis­
aggregation, products are classified with respect to end-uses but 
these need not imply similar input requirements. In the framework
The SITC used here is the first revision. A second revision has 
caused further changes, but does not touch upon the nature of 
the argument of course.




























































































of dynamic comparative advantage information on both is required. 
In terms of our textile example, 'yarn of continuous synthetic 
fibre' (SITC 65161) is essentially a chemical product from a 
physical capital intensive industry and often based on oil deriv­
atives, whereas 'cotton yarn & thread, grey, not mercerized'
(SITC 6513) can in principle be produced on simple spinning ma­
chines with substantial low-skill labour, raw cotton and small- 
scale plants. The great difference in NIC shares of EC imports 
of the two textiles can be readily explained in terms of availa­
bility of factor inputs if one disaggregates fully, whereas some 
of these insights are lost when imports are studied at the level 
of 'textile yarn & thread' (SITC 651).
Table 4 provides summary information by means of various in­
dicators on the NIC performance in EC manufactures' imports (ex­
cept chemicals) in a number of selected three-digit sectors, with 
some two- or four-digit ones if relevant. Sectors have been in­
cluded if, in 1975, the NIC share of EC imports of the category 
concerned was above 10%. If this was the case already at the 
two-digit level, higher degrees of disaggregation have been 
avoided. In other words, the highest degree of aggregation has 
been chosen at which the 1975 NIC share in sectoral EC imports 
was above 10%. It is expected that, with the possible exception 
of a single product case outside these sectors, a fairly broad, 
yet disaggregated picture of NIC-EC manufactures trade, and par­
ticularly its sensitive elements, can be so provided. However,
lectively as one runs into very serious data problems. The 
OECD, for instance, is not consistent over the years in pre­
senting the (same) five-digit product groups or in presenting a 
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one should appreciate the selectivity of the presentation in 
its concentration on possible problem sectors. In addition, two 
exceptions to the above-10% criterion have been made in cases
where evidently no adjustment issue has arisen in the European
„ . 14Community.
Eleven out of thirteen sectors show an enlargement of the 
NIC share in EC imports of more than one percentage point, with 
radio receivers and travel goods, handbags, etc. making a spec­
tacular jump of some 14 points in four years only. Calculating 
and accounting machines is the only sector where the NIC share 
declined (by 1.7 points) but even here one has to be careful 
about the volume as the simple calculators declined in price (at 
least relatively to the more sophisticated ones). NIC exports in 
this sector are heavily concentrated in simple calculators the 
production of which has now become fully standardized.
The general NIC performance in what presumably could be 
'problem sectors' is remarkable. As we shall see later, in a 
number of these sectors NICs suffer from protection, often quan-
1 4In 'wood manufactures, not elsewhere specified' (SITC 632; box­
es, cases, crates, builders' woodwork, etc.) there seems to be 
little if any such problem. This has to do partly with the 
preponderance of the raw material input and partly with the al­
ready achieved specialization in quality wood in many EC coun­
tries. Beyond any doubt is the case of cork manufactures (SITC 
633) where Portugal and Spain together reach a share of 83.4% 
of EC imports in 1975 and a Community industry hardly exists. 




























































































titative protection. Table 4 strongly suggests that such protec­
tion has served as a brake at best.
Four sectors have moved from NIC shares in EC imports of 
above 20% to shares above or equal to 30%. This seems to be rath­
er high and may be expected to lead, to adjustment problems if im­
port value or speed (or both) are considerable. The 1979 import 
values (from NICs) are surely not small (#372 million or beyond) 
with clothing as a very large one. The rates of import growth are 
much higher than one might expect by comparison to non-problem 
sectors or overall rates. For example, all four are considerably 
higher than the overall EC import growth rate for SITC 6/8 (105%; 
see Table 2) or than for chemicals (120%). Another interesting 
comparison is with the 6% growth norm of the first Multi-Fibre Ar­
rangement (1973-1977): if these high NIC share sectors would have
been subject to an across-the-board rule of 6% EC import growth
from NICs, and if EC inflation in the period is assumed to have
1 5been 10% annually, the import growth rate for NICs would have 
been 81%. The four growth rates, however, are close to or beyond 
twice such magnitudes.
If one pays attention to import growth rates— a crucial indi­
cator for NICs compared with other LDCs--the performance is im­
pressive, given increasing protection and a low growth climate in 
the Community. Assuming an EC inflation of 10% annually, the real 
average import growth for eleven out of thirteen sectors has been
This is higher than the actual weighted average. The consumer 
price deflator and the import price deflator for the EC are 
resp.: 1976 (10.1 and 11.5%); 1977 (9.7 and 8.3%); 1978 (7.1





























































































above 14% annually (from NICs) and even reaches to slightly beyond 
25% (travel goods, handbags, etc.). Though Table 4 gives a very 
partial view of the Community's imports, it does show that the NIC 
performance has now spread over a considerable number of sectors 
combining fairly high import shares for these countries with high 
growth rates of their supplies.
On the other hand, the competitive pressures from NICs are 
still heavily concentrated in these thirteen sectors. The ten 
sectors resorting under 'other manufactured goods' make up no less 
than 74.6% of the total EC NIC-imports in these goods in 1979, 
whereas the three sectors listed, resorting under 'machinery and 
transport equipment', only reach 22.5% of total EC NIC-imports of 
these goods (which are already modest, see Table 3). Apart from 
radio and TV sets and perhaps some electrical appliances, SITC 7 
does not encompass adjustment problems vis-à-vis the NICS. Even 
in the products mentioned, it is Japan which causes pressures, 
when they arise at all. This holds especially for TV sets and not 
so much for radios although the latter's EC import growth rate is 
much more impressive and starts from a larger base. The big elec- 
tric/electronic companies of the Community seem convinced that ra­
dios are a market without any growth potential and an evident com­
parative disadvantage (only France has had temporary protection). 
The colour TV set market is not yet saturated, however, commits 
much more resources than radio production (per set) and pertains to 
some significant technological issues. The most important one is 
patent protection for PAL colour technology which, it is feared, 
cannot compete with Japanese technology once the patents expire 
(1981). The significance of the NICs is merely that they further 
add to these pressures. In mid-1980 one could observe Philips 




























































































EC trade protection against colour TV sets to replace the shelter 
provided by the patents.
Another example in SITC 7 can clarify why the NICs only ex­
ceptionally cause sectoral adjustment problems there. The domi­
nant share of Spain in the NIC share of imports of 'machinery and 
transport equipment' is not due to the sectors mentioned in Table 
4 but to such sectors as 'office machines other than calculating 
and accounting machines', certain 'non-electrical machinery and 
parts', 'internal combustion engines' and, above all, automobiles, 
primarily exported to France and Italy. In all these internation­
alized sectors, the NIC (or Spanish) share is very small for the 
Community— except for French auto imports from Spain. Moreover, 
trade often results from direct investments of Community firms so 
that the adjustment is taken care of by the market. However, the 
small NIC share in total SITC-7 EC imports of these goods still 
represents a large part of the EC imports of 'machinery and trans­
port equipment' from NICs.
The 'machinery' sector seems to be one of the few sectors
where EC direct investments in NICs generate substantial imports
1 6of goods previously produced in the Common Market. Trade creat­
ing direct investments tend to accelerate the exploitation of the 
potential comparative advantages of NICs. A dramatic instance can 
be detected in the case of thermionic valves, etc. (SITC, old, 
7293; new, 776) where the 1975 NIC share in EC imports is only 
6.2%. But this does not include Dutch non-allocated imports— pre-
16See Turner et al. (1980, p. 8) where the importance of direct 





























































































sumably from Philips's subsidiaries in Taiwan and Singapore— , 
bringing the NIC share to 19.0%! In 1979, the NIC share has 
grown to 23%, including 11.0% or close to half a billion US dol­
lars for Philips alone. It is typical that the extremely interna­
tionalized electronics sector plays the game of protection 
(Philips on colour TV sets) together with the exploitation of com­
parative advantage of NICs in specific other goods (Philips in the 
Far East) and research-intensive breakthroughs in advanced tech­
nology (Philips on video/disc innovations).
The story is quite different in 'other manufactured goods'. 
The nature and extent of the adjustment problem is not merely de­
termined by the combination of initially high import shares of 
NICs (often higher than in SITC 7) with high growth rates of NIC 
imports, but also by the fact that further specialization into 
high value-added 'up-market' products has become increasingly dif­
ficult because entire sectors have lost their comparative advan­
tage. As is known, the adjustment pains of dismantling and dis­
missals so as to move to another sector (intersectoral adjustment) 
are usually considered to be much greater. For workers of any 
skill-level except the minimum, it may imply that their sector- 
specific knowledge and experience depreciates sharply in value, in 
turn causing personal problems of acceptance and lower wages else­
where. Even more serious is the possibility that the skill pro­
file of workers moving out of one sector is so different from that 
wanted for the vacancies in expanding sectors that frictional un-




























































































employment becomes structural. Finally, the overall climate of 
stagnant consumer demand and falling investment in the Community, 
on top of business insecurity about future energy prices and the 
borrowing capacity of important purchasers of EC exports (such as 
some LDCs, a few NICs and Poland, for instance) is not particu­
larly conducive to smooth shrinking processes in comparative dis­
advantage sectors.
This has led to increasing pressures for protection espe­
cially in 'other manufactured goods', mostly against NICs but 
sometimes also against the US (in steel, synthetic fibre carpets) 
and others. Table 4 has to be considered with at least a global 
notion of the protection involved. This paper is not the place 
to deal with actual protection in depth. The extent and cover­
age, let alone the incidence, of today's protection is exceeding­
ly hard to capture. The following evidence claims little more 
than illustrative information on some of the sectors listed in 
Table 4. Firstly, some indications of actual tariff protection 
can be provided. In an interesting paper Olechowski & Sampson 
(1980) have calculated the weighted average tariffs if one does
1 8not only look to official Tariff Schedules listing MFN tariffs, 
but also takes into consideration that the EC has a plethora of 
special trade agreements, including of course the Generalized 
System of Preferences, all lowering tariffs for the trading part­
ners concerned. Though sectors are not identically defined as in 
Table 4, the impression that EC tariff rates for developing coun-
MFN tariffs are tariffs for imported goods from all countries 





























































































tries are very low is confirmed: wood and wood products, 1.6%;
textiles and textile arts, 8.9% (but only 4.2% for developed 
trading partners); footwear and accessories, 10.1 (and only 3.3 
for developed countries) and miscellaneous manufactured arti­
cles, 9.5%. Surely, these low tariffs even in sensitive goods
19cannot be a true hindrance for NICs.
Secondly, a notion of various non-tariff distortions can be 
obtained by studying official documentation (note that this ap­
proach merely establishes a minimum estimate of non-tariff pro­
tection) . Here, the picture changes dramatically. Olechowski & 
Sampson apply a frequency index indicating the (unweighted) 
share of the number of classification headings of goods on the 
four-digit level the imports of which are subject to some form 
of import control. The controls may be little more than early 
warning systems such as surveillance schemes (the EC had one for 
cutlery, a sector listed in Table 4); others could be quotas, 
licensing arrangements, import price controls (as in steel; at 
present only relevant for Spain and South Korea) and various of­
ficially agreed export restraints. Non-tariff distortions of 
the EC turn out to be very frequent and 90% of them are discrim­
inatory. The share of discriminatorily 'controlled' trade items 
in the total number of four-digit items for 'wood and wood prod-
19 It should not be forgotten that this ignores so-called 'effective 
protection': the fact that tariffs are higher the higher the stage of 
production. It is known that the structure of effective protection 
(also) in the EC is significantly biased against processing of raw 
materials and production of semi-manufactures in LDCs. See Lai (1979) 




























































































ucts' is 18.4%, for 'paper' (not listed in Table 4) 27.7%, for
'textiles and textile arts.' 75.4%, for 'footwear' 15.7% (which
is one-third of the US rate) and for 'basic metal products'
(like cutlery) 7.9%. Miscellaneous manufactured arts, have,
however, only 3.7% of items 'controlled' (all figures for 1976).
Other work confirms the sharp rise in EC protection vis-à-vis
20)developing countries. According to Page (1980), 34% of EC
manufactures' imports from developing countries in 1979 is, what
21she calls "mainly managed", which is higher than the OECD
^See especially Nowzad (1978), Murray, Schmidt & Walter (1978)
and Turner et al. (1980, p. 15). The following examples are taken
from Nowzad (1978, App.s. X, XIII and XIV; manufactures only). At 
the end of 1977 Taiwan suffered from an import prohibition (!) in 
radio's (France), a license scheme in umbrella's (France) and a 
quota for umbrella's (Germany). In the 1970's South Korea suffered 
from a license scheme in footwear (United Kingdom) and quota for 
black & white t.v. sets (United Kingdom), for radio's (France; 
two temporary ones), for umbrellas (France; two temporary ones), 
for silk fabrics and for toys (France), as well as license schemes 
in cassette recorders and cutlery (Denmark). At the end of 1977 
the Philippines suffered from a tariff quota in veneers and ply­
wood (EEC; initial zero tariff). The list does not include protec­
tion under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement.
^Here, LDCs include the Middle East. Note that she applies
1974 trade figures to 1979 restrictions in order to avoid that 
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overall share.
Thirdly, there are the two Multi-Fibre Arrangements, preced­
ed by the Long-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles. Over time 
these arrangements have become broader in product coverage and in 
coverage of 'Fibre' exporters (now 29 countries!), more stringent 
in terms, permit many more downward exceptions to the rule of 6%
import growth and leave ever more diplomatic room for bilateral 
22dictates. In textiles and clothing the EC has now become a 
champion in protection. Therefore it is truly remarkable that 
the four sectors listed in Table 4 still register import growth 
rates of 141% - 171% which is approximately double the 6% rule 
(including 10% average annual inflation). The explanation is to 
be found in the chances given to younger NICs facing less strin­
gent controls than South Korea, Hong Kong and especially Taiwan 
in clothing and the relatively mild attitude towards Spain and 
Portugal, and a few young NICs in certain textiles. In textile 
yarn & thread, NICs like Turkey, Egypt, Argentina and Israël man­
aged to increase their exports to the EC by 400% or more. In wo­
ven cotton fabrics it is especially Greece, Spain, Egypt, India 
and Thailand; in made-up textile articles it is South Korea, Por­
tugal and Israël; in clothing, it is Greece, India, Thailand, 
Singapore and the Philippines. Established suppliers, on the 
other hand, see their exports increase by barely more than infla­
tion .
In the case of textiles it is hard to tell whether we con­
front a NIC problem or a more general North-South problem. The 
essential distinction between the two is the import growth rate,
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once a substantial import level has been achieved. One gets the 
impression that the Second, and the soundings about the Third, 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement are basically attempting to maintain mar­
ket shares for domestic producers. Hence, the concern is not 
about the rate of import growth, disrupting markets and serious­
ly injuring local (EC) producers, but about the level of im­
ports. The forms of protection chosen— quantitative, mostly—  
seem to hint at such an inference as well. But that would point 
to very different underlying causes for protection.
Concern about the level of competitive supplies can be
translated into concern of the levels of profits and wages, or
about employment if capital/labour substitution would be shown
to be irrelevant and NIC imports crucial. Hence, if we accept
the results of many studies on the impact of LDC exports on em- 
23ployment in the OECD economy (shown to be minimal), concern 
about import levels, and the resistance to even moderate in­
creases of export shares of poor countries— NICs or not— point 
to issues of (domestic, not global) income distribution. In 
contrast, the NIC problem ought to be strictly related to the 
social, human and technical processes of adjustment that take 
time and should not become more costly than the gains from rely­
ing on cheap imports.
On the other hand, Table 4 and the material underlying it 
show clearly that even in textiles and clothing younger NICs 
still have switching possibilities that are not feasible for un­
developed countries with incidental clothing firms. It is the 
'graduating' NICs the textiles and clothing exports of which are 
throttled.




























































































5. Adjustment to NICs and the Community's trade 
policy
The European Community, being a set of economies of the 
mixed economic order, may choose between three distinct methods of 
adjustment to manufactures imports from NICs: by market forces
alone, by industrial policy or by trade policy. Although current 
practice clearly shows a reliance on some mixture of the three, 
it is useful for purposes of analysis to establish to what extent 
they are substitutes. In what follows,to be a substitute will not 
only refer to the effects upon (the direction of) industrial 
structural change, but also to the level and allocation of the 
costs of adjustment. In turn, these properties can be traced back 
to political processes in mixed economies, both nationally and at 
the Community level.
Given certain conditions, market processes lead to 
effective, early and continuous adjustment. In principle, markets 
are signalling devices and ignoring signals of declining sales or 
profits is penalized after some time. The effects on industrial 
structural change will be to have resources shift out of com­
parative disadvantage products into similar but higher value-added 
goods (existing, newly invented or differentiated) or into less 
similar, if not entirely different products. Specialization
within the same industry is normally considered to be a less costly 
form of adjustment than shifting resources between industries. It 
is often claimed that market integration within the EC in the 1960's 




























































































in a large number of sectors. In an open world economy with un­
abated technological progress, the pressures for continuous ad­
justment to change are substantial arid their origins complex.
Markets simplify the monitoring of change by coordinating in­
formation and transforming it into signals that consumers, re­
tailers and producers immediately understand.
A non-exhaustive list of conditions for markets to perform 
their tasks properly includes workable competition, reasonable 
predictability of demand and supply trends (or at least market 
agents ought to have that perception) and a fair degree of inter­
regional and intersectoral mobility irrespective of age, of skill, 
and of cyclical downswings. If these conditions are approximated, 
market processes tend to minimize the costs of adjustment for the 
factors of production involved, tend to allocate these costs to 
the 'adjusters' and not to others, and tend to create, by awarding 
efficiency and superior performance, an incentive system for the 
persistence of competition and for new entrants (from anywhere).
This is essentially how market adjustment processes have 
functioned when national EC markets were opened up around the turn 
of the 1960's. When the Dillon and Kennedy Round, as well as a 
quantum jump in international direct investment, further inter­
nationalized the economies of member states, market processes were 
still treasured as an effective, least-cost method of adjustment. 
Apart from a weak attempt to respond to the American Challenge by 
a Community Industrial Policy in advanced technology, there was no 
call on substitutes. Quite the contrary, a liberal common commercial 
policy in manufactured goods was complementary in giving even more 




























































































Industrial policy, here defined for simplicity as a 
set of non-mandatory government incentives such as aid and dis­
criminatory procurement to influence structural industrial change, 
has the effect of altering the speeds of various sectoral adjust­
ments. Although there exists a number of strictly economic justi­
fications for specific forms of industrial policy - they relate
to the assurance of the adequate functioning of market adjustment -
24the practice of the 1970's in the European Community moved
away from such approaches in assuming more and more conservative 
overtones.. The Commission had to concentrate on rescueing the 
customs union, and with it the notion of undistorted competition 
throughout the Community, by pursuing a trial-and-error strategy of 
surveillance and prohibition of national aid schemes on the basis 
of art.s 85/86 and 92-94, EEC Treaty. Apart from the special case 
of shipbuilding, the sectors recurring are synthetic and natural 
textiles, clothing, footwear and steel. This industrial policy 
is quite an imperfect substitute for market processes of adjustment.
National aid schemes tend to slow down, if not block, adjustment.
o c:The Community, its formal emphasis on the necessity of adjustment 
notwithstanding, actually appears to get no further than the har­
monization of the national degrees of slowing down adjustment.
Apart from steadily weakening French indicative planning and 
Italian interventionism, industrial policy in the 1960's was mostly 
paper work, both at the EC and country level. The conspicuous moves 
by countries (Concorde, aluminium, gas, oil) were primarily related
to economic security. Regional industrial policy also played a role.
25 By such norms as : aid ought to be temporary, ought not to 




























































































The costs of such an industrial policy tend to be higher 
than in case of market adjustment for two reasons. First/ the 
cumulative costs over time tend to be higher since relatively 
low-productivity sectors can remain longer in business or can 
afford to improve efficiency and performance later. Secondly, there 
is a penalty to efficient competitors, be they domestic or foreign, 
because their market shares will grow more slowly than otherwise. Aid 
to ailing producers therefore tends to undermine the incentive 
system for the maintenance of permanent efficiency and for new 
entrants. Also, the allocation of costs is at least partly shifted 
to non-adjusters like the rest of the domestic economy (via the 
budget) and to foreign suppliers. In defense of industrial policy 
it should be said that at least the domestic costs of subsidies 
are visible for politicians and public (and so perhaps subject to 
political pressures to minimize aid) and that price competition 
remains (so consumers do not suffer). Of course, other instruments 
such as government procurement from weak domestic producers do have 
concealed costs.
Trade policy can be effective in influencing the speed 
of adjustment of comparative (dis)advantage products. Within the 
EC the customs union implies the transfer of domestic jurisdiction 
on trade policy to common decision-making. Thus, trade policy 
has not served as an alternative for market adjustment in the 
early 1960's when market integration was in full process. But 
it can play a role as an alternative to market adjustment to world 
competition, or of industrial policy. The Common Market increasing­
ly turns to conservative trade policy as a 'superior' option to 




























































































is heavily biased towards less-developed countries which, in manu­
factured products, often means the NICs. In fact the Community's 
common commercial policy (CCP) has a Janus face in that it benignly 
pursues the improvement of access for non-socialist LDCs (Lome 
Treaties, Asean, Maghreb, Generalized System of Preferences) while 
using plain commercial power to extract export restraints as soon 
as their supplies call forth resistance to adjustment.
The costs of such a trade policy are higher than in
the case of industrial policy but vary with the nature of the
2 6protectionist instrument . If we concentrate on 'voluntary 
export restraints' (VER) imposed upon NICs, the costs will be higher 
for the domestic consumers (and this will outweigh the costs other­
wise borne as taxpayers). Also, the penalty for NIC-producers is 
more severe as efficiency and performance cannot possibly improve 
their access, being quantitatively given. Since VERs are dis­
criminatory, the victimized NICs observe their competitors penetrate 
the same markets, which deals another blow at the incentive system 
they believe they can usefully employ for development. If they 
then diversify successfully (with all the costs of adjustment) they 
may run into a new dead-end street. Finally, the costs of main­
taining low-productivity sectors in advanced countries tends to 
be higher under VERs because market shares are even less likely to 
decrease than under industrial policy unless VERs apply to very 
few out of a multitude of suppliers and permit import growth. How-
For a distinction between hard and soft protection on the 





























































































ever, if VERs quickly spread to all major suppliers and become 
stricter all the time, trade policy ceases to be an instrument of 
adjustment. Rather it becomes an instrument which shelters the un­
willingness to adjust to NICs.
The political economy of adjustment to NICs in the EC is 
now easy to sketch in its contours. At the member state level, 
pressure groups that call for relief from the pains of adjust­
ment cannot be helped through trade policy as the instrument is 
transferred to Brussels. Within limits, however, industrial policy 
is possible. The initially liberal trade policy of the EC mean­
while continues to create incentives for a series of NICs to export 
so that adjustment pressures increase in the sectors first aided 
and spread to other ones. Gradually, industrial policy becomes 
visibly expensive and is also likely to become incompatible with 
the customs union rules. Since the Commission can only forbid 
national aid but not replace it by Community aid, pressures shift 
eventually to the instruments the Commission can use : those
of trade policy. The advantages to the various decision makers are 
substantial. The lobbies and pressure groups prefer the use of 
trade policy, especially the quantitative element of it, as it 
gives more certainty about the adjustment pressure to expect.
The national politicians will be content because it will spare 
them the critique of noisy pressure groups - loudly attributing 
sectoral unemployment to the NICs - while relieving heavy budgetary 
pressures. The Commission, always eager to boost Community in­
struments, is in a bind, since it is independent enough to perceive 
the grave dangers of protectionism. Its accommodative reaction is 




























































































for (say) 6% import growth, by minimizing the number of victim
27NICs and by permitting loopholes in the text . This clever 
game of damage limitation pays off in commercial diplomacy and 
in its relation to the Council.
But the recessionary circumstances of the late 1970's 
have undermined the accommodative CCP. The Commission's lax and 
imperfect control of imports under the first Multi-Fibre Arrangement 
drew heavy criticism. Member states became more aggressive in 
requests, despite their trade pledge in the OECD. In 1977 France 
blackmailed the EC by installing unilateral quota's on several 
textile and clothing imports. In order to meet the threat to the 
customs union, the Commission had to follow suit. The Common Commercial 
Policy was bound to become protectionist towards NICs in order to 
rescue internal market integration. Nevertheless, quotas under the 
second Multi-Fibre Arrangement were subdivided and assigned to in­
dividual Member States, degrading the EC to something of a free 
trade area with renewed emphasis on certificates of origin at intra- 
EC borders.
The political economy of the present CCP is frought 
with costly imperfections. The paramount failure is that the costs 
of slow adjustment are first significantly enlarged and subsequently 
shifted to 'non-adjusters' that have no say in. the decision-making 
process! They include consumers and efficient firms in the EC using
Threatened NIC-producers can also be lured into restraints by 
allowing them to seize the rent. This can be done by giving rather 




























































































imported inputs from NICs that are controlled, but above all they 
include the workers in NICs (their management too, depending
on 'rents' and possibilities for export collusion). On the Community 
side it ought to be said that commercial policy making is dangerous­
ly hidden from the public and is out of control for national parlia­
ments and the European one. Lobbies talk directly to Eurocrats and 
sometimes the latter lean on the expertise of the former in inter­
national fora or negotiations. Until now the process has not 
slipped out of hand completely due to the interest some member 
countries still have in exports within the category of 'other 
manufactured goods', including footwear, travel goods and handbags 
(Italy) and textiles and clothing (Germany, Italy).
On the NICs side, it is increasingly realized that 
bargains are becoming impossible. One can defend consultations 
between NICs and the EC about development plans that focus on key 
export products in need of market access to the Community (Hager, 
1980), avoiding 'rifle-shot' incidents. One could even argue that 
a selective safeguard-clause in the GATT to deal with market 
disruption is superior to its present art. 19 (that is non-dis- 
criminatory), if only it were temporary in application and under 
multilateral surveillance, ensuring minimal costs to NICs. But it 
is a sham to compel NICs to 'agree' to VERs that are unilateral 
quotas in all but name.
It is the good fortune of the NICs as a group that 




























































































activity 2®. Time is fully consumed by extinguishing fires in 
commercial diplomacy or in intra-EC bargains on the nitty-gritty 
product level. As we have seen in section 4, policy being dis­
criminatory and product-by-product, the dynamism of young NICs 
in textiles and clothing, and of all NICs in products where pro­
tection does not yet cover the 'up-market' goods, still beats the 
CCP. Where it does not, it is the recessionary demand (synthetic 
fibres, certain steel semi-manufactures) rather than the CCP which 
seems to be the primary cause.
6. Improving the Community's relations with NICs
The European Community has substantial interests in 
rapidly improving commercial relations with Newly Industrializing 
Countries. The EC ought to develop a long run commercial policy 
vis-à-vis the NICs based on a profound investigation of the inter­
national and domestic, political and economic costs and benefits 
of alternative strategies. The case for a liberal and adaptive 
policy embedded in a well-developed diplomatic framework of conflict 
management is a strong one. It rests on two sets of interests for 
the Community, still apart from the interests of the NICs.
The first set of arguments has to do with the costs 
of the current policy, sliding ever more into a plain servant of 
low-productivity, high costs producers' lobbies. Not only do the 
diplomatic and political frictions caused by shifting the costs of 
the unwillingness to adjust onto relatively poor trading partners 
lead to harmful attitudes and stiffened NIC-protection,





























































































the Common Market bears heavy domestic costs as well. These costs 
include the static losses from misallocations, the losses of effi­
ciency in sheltered firms and the elusive, but ultimately crucial 
loss of dynamism as the incentive system for efficiency and per­
formance is consistently penalized by aid schemes and protection to 
non-performers. In an interesting study (EC, 1979, ch. Ill, 5) it 
is shown that the Community has a fair record up to the mid-seventies 
in adjusting to global structural change. The Japanese example 
is superior, however, and underscores the importance of anticipa­
ting and facilitating adjustment rather than accommodating low- 
productivity sectors.
An obstacle for a market oriented Community adjustment 
policy is the separation between industrial and commercial policy. 
There seems to be no sensible economic reason why 'Internal Market' 
and 'Industrial Policy' are resorting under one Directorate-General 
whilst trade policy, being a partial substitute for the latter, 
has no organic link with it. Even the mere negative competences 
of the Commission in industrial policy could be applied with 
explicit reference to adjustment clauses in trade policy agreements. 
Toughness in judging aid schemes does not square with shambles in 
trade measures in (often) exactly the same sectors.
The second set of arguments has to do with commercial 
power. Commercial power vis-a-vis the NICs can no longer be taken 
for granted. The EC has been lulled by the ease with which it played 
the bilateral, sectoral power game after generally agreeing on the 
Second Multi-Fibre Arrangement in early 1978. Basic to the commercial 




























































































of mutual trade to overall domestic economic activity for the two
parties. As Table 3 and other data clearly suggest, access to the
EC is much more important to the NICs than the NIC-trade is for the
EC. There still is not one single sector, as defined in Table 4,
in which the share of no less than 16 NICs is larger than the share
of intra-EC imports in total imports (although some sectors in
1979 came rather close). The share of NIC-imports in EC production
29would be even lower
But other power factors have changed in the late 1970s. 
Though the big surplus of the EC in manufactures' trade with NICs 
is relatively decreasing, this is predominantly due to Spain, South 
Korea and Taiwan. With Hong Kong the EC run a deficit in 1979 but 
recent growth rates of EC exports to Hong Kong were much higher 
than those of imports. Other NICs provide the Community with a 
comfortable surplus, that enhances the Community's vulnerability in 
times of heavy overall deficits. NICs could start exploiting this.
More important, however, is the stake in the volume 
EC-NIC trade has now reached. Is it realized in Brussels that EC 
1979 imports from (16) NICs in 'machinery and transport equipment' 
and in 'other manufactured goods' amounted to 9 3% of those from the
y See, for some examples of disaggregated sectoral import/ 
production ratios, Nowzad (1978, p. 105). The 1976 ratios for 
French imports from all LDCs never come above 16%. For import 
penetration rates (see fn. 3) of some clusters of two-digit sectors, 
for the EC, in 1975, see UNCTAD, 1979, Table 7.1. For manufactures 




























































































US, up from 68% in 1975? Has one observed that the 1979 exports 
of 'machinery and transport equipment' of the Common Market to 16 
NICs are one-third higher than those to the US? Is it known that 
EC 1979 exports in 'other manufactured goods' to the US and to 
the NICs are at par while EC chemicals exports to NICs are nearly 
one and a half times higher than those to the US? Even if Japan 
and the US are combined, EC 1979 exports in chemicals and in 'machinery 
and transport equipment' to NICs are still equal or larger than to 
these big traders.
These stakes in trade are not in the least reflected in 
the conduct of commercial policy. With the US and Japan complex 
bilateral networks of information and regular consultation have been 
built up, including the highest political level in world economic 
summits, and incorporating multitudinous contacts in multilateral 
fora such as GATT and the OECD (and its Steel Committee, for instance) 
For NIC-EC trade such a framework is lacking altogether. Contacts 
are occasional and the style of diplomacy reminds one of old- 
fashioned tariff wars. The EC may even be forced into more regular 
consultation and bargaining on equal footing if the NICs were to 
found a common organisation. Such a "NIC-caucus" would not be easy 
to set up but the formation of an effective coalition of lome-associates has . 
shown that it is a realistic possibility. A tightly managed NIC-caucus would 
have several powerful weapons. It could bring in more authority 
by blocking the Community's bilateral approach to NICs. It could 
also bargain over a wider scale of products than any single NIC 
could do. Its ultimate weapon would be a buyer's boycott on selected 



























































































-  50 -
could consist in discriminatory retaliation with simul­
taneous offers for trade liberalisation in response to blatant 
forms of EC protectionism. Since the NICs, except Singapore and 
Hong Kong, are highly protectionist themselves, there is ample room 
for organizing countervailing power. Finally, a NIC caucus could 
facilitate prior consultation about development plans with a view 
of preventing 'rifle-shot' incidents.
It is highly desirable that a more adequate management 
of EC-NIC trade relations be established, reflecting an awareness 
of the costs of the recent inward-looking commercial policy and of 
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